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CONFRONTATION AND THE DEFINITION OF CHUTZPA
Richard D. Friedman*
You may know the standard illustration of chutzpa - the man who
kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy
on an orphan.1 In this article, I discuss a case of chutzpa that is nearly
as outlandish - the criminal defendant who, having rendered his victim
unavailable to testify, contends that evidence of the victim's statement
should not be admitted against him because to do so would violate his
right to confront her. I contend that in a case like this the defendant
should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right. On the same
grounds, if the jurisdiction applies a rule against hearsay, he should be
deemed to have forfeited the right to invoke it against evidence of the
statement.
In one sense, this conclusion is very unstartling. Courts have held,
in a variety of contexts, that if the accused has rendered a potential
witness unavailable - whether by murder, concealment, intimidation,
improper payment, or chicanery - the accused should be deemed to
have forfeited the confrontation right or the hearsay objection.2 And this
rule, which I shall call the forfeiture principle, has gained legislative
recognition as well in some jurisdictions. Long ago it was reflected in
section 13(3)(a) of the English Criminal Justice Act (1925). That clause
has since been superseded by an arguably overbroad provision, section
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1 See Leo Rosten, The Joys of Yiddish, (1968) 92 ("[tlhe classic definition"); Alan M.
Dershowitz, Chutzpah, (1991) 18 ("Itlhe classic illustration").
2 Some courts speak of the defendant as having waived the confrontation right, but this
is inaccurate: It is not necessarily so that an accused who has acted in the ways
described here has knowingly, intelligently, and deliberately relinquished the right.
See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1053 (1983).
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23(3) of the 1988 Act, 3 which is similar in some respects to section 1OA(b)
of Israel's Evidence Ordinance.4 Soon, it appears, the principle will also
be reflected, though with somewhat greater solicitude to the rights of
criminal defendants, in a new Rule 804(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence of the United States.5
3 Sec. 13(3) of the 1925 Act allowed the use of a deposition against an accused if the
witness was unavailable for any of several reasons, including having been "kept out
of the way by means of the procurement of the accused or on his behalf". The
limitation as to how the witness was "kept out of the way" sometimes prevented
application of the provision. See R. v. O'Loughlin & McLaughlin, [19881 3 All E.R.
431, 85 Cr. App. Rep. 157, 161-62 (1986) (failing to find sufficient proof that threats
were made by or on behalf of the defendant, and refusing to hold that threats "with
the defendant's interests at heart" would suffice).
Sec. 23(3) of the 1988 Act is considerably more generous to prosecutors. Subject to
some qualifications, it allows admissibility in criminal proceedings of a statement
that is embodied in a document and was "made to a police officer or some other person
charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders" if "the person
who made it does not give oral evidence through fear or because he is kept out of the
way". This provision has been held to apply even if the witness does give some
testimony at trial, if the testimony was limited (to what extent it must be does not
yet seem clear) because of fear. R. v. Ashford Justices, exp. Hilden, [1993] Q.B. 555,
[19931 2 All E.R. 154 (1992). Also, the disjunctive wording can be satisfied by proof
of spontaneous fear, not attributable to any affirmative conduct by the defendant or
anybody else. One significant qualification on section 23 is that, in general, if the
statement was made for "pending or contemplated criminal proceeedings" or "a
criminal investigation", admission requires leave of the court, which should not be
given unless doing so appears in the interests of justice upon consideration of factors
laid out by the statute in section 26. This qualification may reflect some implicit
sensitivity to the confrontation right discussed in this article.
4 Under that provision, subject to some qualifications, a written statement made by
a witness out of court may be admissible in criminal proceedings "if the person who
made it is not a witness either because he refuses to testify or is incapable of testifying
or because he cannot be brought to court since he is not alive or cannot be found,
provided that the court is satisfied, from the circumstances of the case, that improper
means have been used to dissuade or prevent the person who made the statement
from giving testimony". Unlike the 1988 English act, this provision requires a
showing of improper means to prevent testimony, rather than simply fear; it does not,
however, require attribution to the defendant.
5 The proposed Rule, which has been approved by the Supreme Court and submitted
to Congress, states a new exception to the rule against hearsay for a statement that
was made out of court by a declarant deemed unavailable to testify at trial and that
satisfies this description:
"Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party that has engaged
or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavail-
ability of the declarant as a witness".
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Thus, I write not to articulate a new principle, but to defend it, to give
some ideas of the issues it raises and how they may be addressed, 6 to
place it in the context of what I believe would be a preferable law of
confrontation and hearsay - and to make a modest suggestion. I
believe the forfeiture principle applies with full force, and without much
controversy, when the declarant, the potential witness whose statement
is at issue, is the victim of the crime alleged. My suggestion is that
courts should be willing to apply the principle reflexively - that is, even
when the act that rendered the declarant-victim unable to testify was
the same criminal act for which the accused is now on trial.
Despite my claim of modesty, reflexive application of the forfeiture
proposal is likely to be controversial. For one thing, it is quite far-
reaching. The reflexive forfeiture principle can, I believe, successfully
address three disparate types of situations with which the courts have
had great difficulty: first, a dying declaration by a homicide victim;
second, the physical inability to testify of the survivor of a savage
assault; and third, the psychological inability to testify of a child victim
of physical or sexual assault.
Furthermore, application of the reflexive forfeiture principle requires
the court to conclude in essence, as a predicate for admissibility of the
evidence, that the defendant is guilty of the very crime with which he
is accused. I do not believe that this is an insuperable objection to the
principle. But it does require that the principle be surrounded by
sufficient procedural safeguards to insure a high probability that the
principle is invoked only when appropriate. And even then, the prin-
ciple must be applied with caution, to ensure that it does not gratui-
tously abrogate the defendant's rights.
Throughout this article, my emphasis will be on the law of the United
States, for that is the only system of law that I know tolerably well. But,
Thus, the wrongdoing must be attributable to the party opponent at least to the
extent that he must have "acquiesced" in it, which presumably requires some degree
of prior knowledge. The progress of the proposed Rule has been rapid; it had not even
been discussed, at least not publicly, when I presented this paper at the International
Conference on Rights of the Accused, Crime Control and Protection of Victims in
Jerusalem in December 1993.
6 An earlier defense of the principle, discussion of some of the issues, and a recommen-
dation for a new Federal Rule much like the one now pending may be found in a
student comment, Paul T. Markland, "The Admission of Hearsay Evidence where
Defendant Misconduct Causes the Unavailability of a Prosecution Witness", (1994)
43 Am. U. L. R. 995.
[Is.L.R. Vol. 31508
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I believe, the confrontation right is more universal. So too are the
problems addressed here. And so too, I believe, is the appeal of the
solution I propose.
In Part I, I set the context for the forfeiture principle against the
general background of the law of hearsay and confrontation, and of the
reformulation of that law that I propose. I suggest that recognition of
the forfeiture principle will allow courts and rulemakers to recognize a
stronger basic confrontation right, and that this in turn will give courts
and rulemakers greater confidence to allow liberal admissibility of
hearsay where no confrontation rights are at stake. In Part II, I discuss
reflexive application of the forfeiture principle. I address general issues
concerning this type of application, show how the principle might apply
in each of the three contexts mentioned above, and argue that it would
lead to more satisfying and sensible results than do the doctrines now
commonly in use.
I. Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture
A. The Traditional Model of Hearsay and Confrontation,
and its Difficulties
American hearsay law adheres to the traditional model: Evidence
that is classified as hearsay is presumptively excluded, 7 but can escape
this barrier if it fits within one of a long list of categorical exceptions,"
or if it is deemed for other reasons to exhibit particular guarantees of
trustworthiness. 9 Superimposed on the body of ordinary hearsay law is
the constitutional right of a criminal defendant, under the Sixth Amend-
ment of the Constitution, "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him". The meaning of the Confrontation Clause is an enigma. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has shown a tendency to construe it nearly
in conformity with the hearsay sections of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. That is, if the declarant's out-of-court statement, offered to prove
7 See Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802.
8 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4).
9 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5). A proposal to replace these exceptions by a new
single exception, Fed. R. Evid. 807, virtually identical to each of them, has been
approved by the Supreme Court of the United States and in all likelihood will become
law in December 1997 at the same time as the new Rule 804(b)(6).
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the truth of what she asserted, is offered against an accused, the Court
will almost certainly perceive the Confrontation Clause as posing no
barrier if the hearsay sections of the Federal Rules do not;10 correspond-
ingly, it seems likely that if a state court admits evidence that would run
afoul of the Federal Rules (which do not apply of their own force in state
courts), the Supreme Court will conclude that the Confrontation Clause
bars the evidence.1
Other common law nations have cut back severely on the rule against
hearsay in civil cases, but they retain it in criminal cases. Although the
retention is not generally phrased in these terms, it is, I believe, in-
tended to preserve the uncertain right that we in the United States refer
to by the label of confrontation. And, while the Continental systems do
not have a law of hearsay, at least not one comparable to that of common
law systems, the European Court of Human Rights protects some right
of confrontation. In interpreting Article 6, paragraphs 112 and 3(d)
13 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the European Court of Human Rights has held that these
provisions, as a general rule, "require that an accused should be given
an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness
against him, either at the time the witness was making his statement
or at some later stage of the proceedings". 14 Moreover, the Court has
made clear that a declarant should be regarded as a witness if her
10 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that Confrontation Clause was not
violated by admission of child's statements, alleging sexual abuse, that fit within
hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made for purposes
of medical treatment, irrespective of whether declarant was available to be a wit-
ness).
11 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding that Confrontation Clause was
violated by admission, under state's residual exception, of child's statement, alleging
sexual abuse, that did not fit any of the categorical exceptions and that the Supreme
Court believed did not have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness).
12 Para. 1 is a general provision guaranteeing a criminal defendant "a fair and public
hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal".
13 Para. 3(d) guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to examine or have examined
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him".
14 Kostouski v. Netherlands, 12 E.H.R.R. 434, 448-49 (1989), 41.
[Is.L.R. Vol. 31
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statement is "before the trial court and ... taken into account by it", even
though the declarant does not actually testify at trial.
15
I believe that these European developments suggest that there is a
fundamental right of confrontation, and that its recognition and protec-
tion do not depend on the jurisdiction maintaining anything resembling
the common law of hearsay. But defining the bounds of this right is no
simple matter. Surely the right cannot be to exclude evidence of any out-
of-court declaration that is offered to prove the truth of what it asserts
and that was made by a person whom the accused has not had an
opportunity to cross-examine. Such an extreme rule would lead to
intolerable results, excluding even such evidence as routine records of
sales prices. But, short of such absolutism, how is the line to be drawn?
I believe that, in using traditional hearsay doctrine to mark out the
bounds of the confrontation right, the common law jurisdictions per-
petuate a great mistake, for several reasons.
First, the key element under traditional hearsay doctrine in deter-
mining whether an item of hearsay should be admitted is often said to
be reliability or, synonymously, trustworthiness. 16 But reliability is
notoriously difficult to determine, especially across a broad category of
cases. It seems bizarre, for example, to hold that, because the declarant
was so distressed that she hardly knew what she was doing, her state-
ment was so reliable - as reflected in the hearsay exception for excited
15 Ibid., 40. The issue in Kostovski was actually whether the declarant could be
considered a witness even though his statement was not read aloud at trial, and the
Court answered in the affirmative. It follows a fortiori that if the statement were
read aloud the declarant would be considered a witness. And indeed, in an extensive
string of cases since Kostovski, the Court has given force to the defendant's right "to
challenge and question a witness against him", Windisch v. Austria, 13 E.H.R.R. 281
(1991) (judgment September 1990), even though the witness made the statement out
of court, before the trial. See, e.g., Saidi v. France, Series A, no. 261-C (20 Sept. 1993).
I offer a comparative perspective on these European cases in an essay, Confrontation
Rights of Criminal Defendants, published in J.F. Nijboer and J.M. Reijntjes, Proceed-
ings of the First World Conference on New Trends in Criminal Investigation and
Evidence (1997) 533-41.
16 "Because hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are designed to protect similar
values and stem from the same roots, ... no independent inquiry into reliability is
required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception". Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted and
punctuation simplified).
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utterances 7 - that we can rest easy about admitting it against the
accused without affording him the right to confront her.
Second, even if reliability were readily determinable, it is an inap-
propriate standard to use for measuring the limits of the confrontation
right. In one sense, it is too restrictive. We do not demand that the ideal
form of evidence - live testimony under oath, subject to cross-exami-
nation - be reliable, for if we did there would never be a conflict of
admissible testimony. We should not impose so stringent a standard on
out-of-court declarations. On the other hand, in one sense a reliability
test is far too lenient. It is most unsatisfactory to say to a criminal
defendant, in effect:
We realize that you have not had a chance to confront the maker of
a crucial statement offered against you, and that this is ordinarily a
fundamental right, but don't worry about that. The judicial system
has determined, based on its profound knowledge of social psychology
and on the circumstances surrounding the making of this statement,
that the statement is highly reliable, that confrontation therefore
would have done you little good, and so that it would be wasteful to
give you the right in this case.
A reliability test, in short, simply does not respond to the underlying
concerns that make the confrontation right fundamental.
Third, linking the confrontation right to hearsay doctrine is bound to
have two ill effects: On the one hand, it makes ordinary hearsay law
too restrictive, and on the other hand, it makes confrontation law
insufficiently protective. 8 In fact, it appears probable that a large part
of the reason why the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence took a
17 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
18 The first of these problems is particularly glaring if the jurisdiction, like all those in
the United States, applies hearsay law in civil as well as in criminal cases. But even
if the jurisdiction does not apply hearsay law in civil cases, the problem remains: The
use of hearsay law to reflect a confrontation right that should be articulated sepa-
rately will tend to result in hearsay law that is too stringent in excluding hearsay
offered by the defendant and hearsay that is offered by the prosecution but does not
raise any genuine confrontation concerns.
The second of these problems - inadequate protection of the confrontation right -
is not substantially affected by whether or not the jurisdiction applies hearsay law
in civil cases.
[Is.L.R. Vol. 31
Nos. 1-3, 1997] CONFRONTATION AND THE DEFINITION OF CHUTZPA 513
rather traditional approach to hearsay law was their concern to protect
the rights of criminal defendants.
B. A Reconceived Confrontation Right
It seems essential, therefore, to break the link between ordinary
hearsay law and the law of confrontation. That is, the confrontation
right must be conceptualized and articulated, as the European Court of
Human Rights has begun to do, in a way that does not depend upon
hearsay doctrine, but rather captures and responds to the underlying
concerns that make the confrontation right fundamental.
I believe that we may discern in the language of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution a key
to understanding the appropriate sense of the confrontation right. That
amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...
This suggests to me that not all hearsay raises a potential confrontation
problem. Rather, the declarant of the statement introduced against the
accused must be, in some sense, a witness against the accused. 19
If the declarant actually testifies at trial for the prosecution, then it
is obvious that the declarant is a witness against the accused and that
the confrontation right applies. Thus, at least ordinarily, the defendant
has the right to subject the witness to adverse examination, under oath
and before the factfinder. In this context, the confrontation right
determines not whether hearsay should be admitted against the defend-
ant, but rather what protections in trial practice should be afforded him.
Now consider the situation in which the prosecution seeks to intro-
duce hearsay - evidence of an out-of-court statement made by the
declarant, offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. My essential
conception is this: Even though the statement was not made in court,
it might amount to witnessing, and so be subject to the confrontation
right, just as much as a statement made from the witness stand, if the
19 In this respect, I agree with the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1992), and also with the analysis of Akhil Amar, in
"Sixth Amendment First Principles", (1996) 84 Geo. L.J. 641, at 691-92, 696. I do
not agree entirely with their analyses, however, and hope to elaborate on the
differences, as well as on the points of agreement, in a forthcoming essay in the
Georgetown Law Journal.
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declarant's anticipation was that the statement would be used in much
the same manner that in-court testimony would be. Note the limitation
on this principle. The declarant did not act as a "witness against" the
accused if she was merely going about her business, criminal or other-
wise, in making the statement. Rather, to be deemed a witness for
purposes of the confrontation right, the declarant should have recog-
nized at the time of the statement that in some sense she was bearing
witness. This occurs when the declarant makes a statement, either
directly to a law enforcement officer or through an intermediary, that
she realizes will likely aid in the investigation or prosecution of a crime.
I believe this description roughly captures the idea of when a declar-
ant should be considered a "witness against" the defendant within the
meaning of the confrontation right. I will be satisfied in this article with
this rough sense of the matter; rather than trying to fine-tune a defi-
nition of "witness", I will refer to the statements meeting this descrip-
tion as "accusatory".20 If the declarant has made an accusatory state-
ment, she has lined up against the accused, or at least with the pros-.
ecution. It is in this situation that the right to confront should attach.
This is not merely a matter of preference in designing a truth-determin-
ing process. Rather, it is a matter of fundamental right, to preserve both
fairness and the perception of fairness. It is unsatisfactory to punish
an accused without giving him an opportunity to confront those who
have borne witness against him, consciously making statements that
might lead to his conviction.
I would apply this confrontation right absolutely, without exceptions,
because it is so fundamental in nature. Thus, for the reasons suggested
above, I would not create an exception to the confrontation right because
the court believes that the particular statement at issue is reliable, or
because the statement fits within a traditional hearsay exception or into
any other broad category of statement that is deemed to be reliable in
general.
20 In the forthcoming essay in the Georgetown Law Journal mentioned above in n. 19,
I will reflect somewhat further on the matter. Perhaps a statement, even though
made outside the law enforcement context, should also be considered accusatory if
it is hostile and accuses the defendant of a crime. The requirement of hostility
distinguishes situations such as that in which a co-conspirator makes a statement,
perhaps in the course of the conspiracy, describing criminal activity of the defendant.
514 [Is.L.R. Vol. 31
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Nor would I hold that the confrontation right applies only when the
declarant is available to be a witness.2 The concept of the right
presented here does not merely express a rule of preference, or a "best
evidence" principle intended to give the prosecutor the incentive to
produce better evidence - live testimony rather than hearsay - where
that is possible. Rather, it reflects a fundamental belief that it is not
tolerable to allow the defendant to be convicted if he has not had an
adequate opportunity to confront persons who have acted as witnesses
against him by making accusatory statements with the anticipation
that they will be used against him by the prosecution.
Such a conviction is obviously intolerable when that lack of opportu-
nity is attributable to the conduct, particularly the wrongful conduct, of
the prosecution. And I believe it does not become tolerable when that
opportunity is attributable to the fault of neither party. In other words,
the risk that the declarant will be unable to testify should fall on the
prosecution rather than on the accused. This sometimes means that,
because of the unavailability of a prospective witness, a successful
prosecution cannot be brought. But that is a familiar proposition. When
witnesses are unable or unwilling to testify, the prosecution - which
21 In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-89 (1970) (concurring), Justice John M.
Harlan II adopted a theory of Confrontation limited to available declarants, and my
friend and colleague Peter Westen defended a similar theory in "The Future of
Confrontation," (1979) 77 Mich. L.R. 1185. Justice Harlan renounced this view a few
months after Green, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-96 (1970) (concurring), in
favor of a more restrictive theory limited to declarants who provide formal testimony.
Interestingly, both Westen and Justice Harlan (in his Green period), while applying
the confrontation right only if the declarant is available, would apply it generally if
this condition is satisfied. See Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 186 ("what I ... deem the
correct meaning of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause - that a State may
not in a criminal case use hearsay when the declarant is available".) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). I believe that in this expansive aspect this concept of confrontation is
too broad: The right should not apply, for example, to routine business records
entered without anticipation that they would be used in investigation or prosecution
of crime, even if the person making the entries would be available as a witness.
Westen, apparently recognizing the problem, suggests that even if the declarant is
available the confrontation right applies only if "the prosecution can reasonably
expect the defendant to wish to cross-examine" the declarant at the time of trial (at
1207). But I do not believe this attempted avoidance works: No matter how routine,
or apparently reliable, the statement might appear to be to the court, the accused
might welcome the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in an attempt to
introduce some element of doubt, and certainly the accused has every incentive to
say he wishes to examine her.
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bears the burden of proving the accused's guilt, and by evidence that
complies with the accused's rights - must do without.
But there is a third situation of unavailability of the witness-declar-
ant - when it is procured by the defendant. And that situation is
radically different.
C. The Forfeiture Principle
A defendant may forfeit his right to confront adverse witnesses by
conduct so obstreperous that the trial cannot be carried on in a suitable
manner with him in the courtroom. 22 In this article, I am considering
forfeiture from the other end - conduct by the defendant that prevents
his confrontation with a prosecution by making it impossible or infea-
sible for the witness, rather than the defendant himself, to be at the
trial.
Consider first a relatively straightforward illustration. The accused
is on trial for narcotics crimes. Shortly before the prosecution's star
witness was about to testify at trial, she was murdered, and compelling
evidence demonstrates that the accused arranged for the murder. The
prosecutor then offers into evidence the grand jury testimony given by
the murdered declarant. The accused objects on the ground that he
never had the opportunity to confront the declarant.2 3 In such a case,
it seems clear to me - as it has to the courts - that the confrontation
right should not apply and prevent the evidence from being admitted,
and on similar grounds neither should the rule against hearsay. This
is the forfeiture principle.
The proper basis for this principle is not, as some courts have sug-
gested it is, the broad dictum that no one should profit by his own wrong.
24
As an ideal, that is probably true, but in some cases exclusion of the
evidence on confrontation grounds will not be necessary to guarantee that
the accused does not profit by his own wrong, and in some cases such
exclusion will not be sufficient to guarantee that result. Furthermore, the
22 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
23 This description closely fits the facts of United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, ibid. (quoting other cases); State v. Corrigan,
10 Kan. App.2d 55, 691 P.2d 1311, 1314 (1984); Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn.
1980).
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dictum might miss the point, because, as discussed below, arguably
wrongdoing does not underlie the forfeiture principle at all.
As to necessity: At least ordinarily, and pretty much always if the
principle is limited to wrongdoing, the act that rendered the declarant
unavailable - in this case, conspiring to murder her - is in itself
punishable by the criminal law. And in this case, though not in all, the
punishment may be greater for that act of wrongdoing than for the crime
currently being tried; therefore, even if the act of rendering the declar-
ant unavailable turns out to be a but-for cause of the accused's avoiding
punishment on the crime now being charged, which of course it will not
always be, the accused may be worse off for having rendered the declar-
ant unavailable.
As to sufficiency: In some cases, there may be no tolerable way of
assuring that the accused does not profit by his own wrong. Suppose
now that the crime for which the accused is on trial is more severely
punished than is the wrongdoing that rendered the declarant unavail-
able. Suppose, for example, a defendant on trial for murder knows a
declarant has made a statement to the police inculpating him. The
defendant may find that intimidating the declarant into silence is
worthwhile, because it substantially increases his chances of success in
the murder trial, even if the price is having to face trial for his threat-
ening conduct. And it may well be that the accused's chances in the
murder trial have indeed been improved, even if his confrontation
objection to the prior statement by the intimidated declarant is denied:
It may be that the police officer's second-hand rendition of that state-
ment is far less powerful evidence against the accused than the declar-
ant's own live, vivid testimony would have been, even though the
accused would have had an opportunity to cross-examine her. There-
fore, unless we are to do something drastic and intolerable like convict
the accused without trial, the accused may be better off for having
rendered the declarant unavailable.
I believe, then, that the broad ideal that no one should benefit by his
own wrong is an inadequate explanation for the admissibility, notwith-
standing the confrontation right, of secondary evidence of a declarant's
accusatory statement when the accused has rendered the declarant
unavailable. A more satisfying explanation may be that the accused
should not be heard to complain about the consequences of his own
conduct. Thus, the accused ought not be able to not be able to cause
exclusion of the secondary evidence on the ground that he has been
unable to confront and examine the declarant when his own conduct
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
accounts for that inability. This principle applies most obviously when
that conduct is wrongful, but arguably it applies even when it is not, so
long as a natural and desired consequence of the conduct was the
declarant's inability to testify.
25
In other words, the forfeiture principle does not say to the accused,
"You have done wrong, and so we will put you in a position no better
for you than that in which you would have been had you done no wrong".
Rather, it says in effect, "You have no valid complaint about the loss of
a right that, as a natural and desired result of your own conduct, it is
impossible to afford you".
2 6
In a variety of circumstances, courts have had rather little difficulty
reaching the result called for by this principle. Whether the accused has
rendered the declarant unavailable by murder,27 intimidation,28 im-
25 See below, n. 30. Note that the proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), quoted above in n.
5, does depend on wrongdoing by the party opponent; in this sense, the proposed Rule
might be too narrow.
One can conceive of situations in which it is merely fortuitous that the defendant's
conduct, even if wrongful, caused the declarant's unavailability to testify: Suppose
the defendant drives negligently on the way to court, and happens to run over the
declarant, who was on her way to testify. But I do not think it is necessary, for the
principle to apply, that rendering the declarant unavailable to testify have been the
motivating, or the principal, purpose of the defendant's conduct.
26 See United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 651 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008
(1975) (the defendant "cannot now be heard to complain that he was denied the right
of cross-examination and confrontation when he himself was the instrument of the
denial"); cf Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1053 (1983) ("A defendant cannot prefer the law's preference [for live testimony
over hearsay] and profit from it ... while repudiating that preference by creating the
condition that prevents it".).
27 E.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1204 (1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627-31 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); People v. LaTorres, 186 A.D.2d 479, 480, 590 N.Y.S.2d
187, 188 (1st Dept. 1992) ("the People proved defendants or one acting in their behalf
caused the death of an eyewitness to the shooting spree herein prior to trial"); State
v. Gettings, 244 Kan. 236, 769 P.2d 25 (1989).
28 E.g., United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918,
934 (1984) (intimidation by father of defendant); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100,
1102 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528,
530-31 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d
624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346, 1355-60 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); State v. Olson,
291 N.W.2d 203, 207-08 (Minn. 1980) (acts of intimidation by co-conspirator attrib-
uted to defendant).
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proper payment,29 or chicanery, 0 or by concealing the declarant or
persuading her to absent herself,31 courts have concluded that the
accused has thereby forfeited his confrontation right, so that secondary
evidence of the declarant's accusatory statement may be admitted.
Of course, application of the forfeiture principle requires the court
to conclude that the defendant has indeed rendered the declarant
unavailable. A threshold question is the applicable standard of proof.
In my view, given the importance of the confrontation right, the court
should not hold that the accused has forfeited it unless the court is
persuaded to a rather high degree of probability that the accused has
rendered the declarant unavailable; 32 a plausible argument can be
29 See United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805,810-11 (M.D. Ga.), conviction aft'd,
981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994)
(confrontation right would be lost on satisfactory showing, not made here, of an
agreement by defendant and declarant that defendant would pay declarant's legal
fees in return for declarant's silence).
30 United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975)
(improper claim by attorney for defendant, supposedly on behalf of declarant, defend-
ant's brother, of privilege against self-incrimination). Had the defendant merely
persuaded the declarant, without coercion, to make a legitimate claim of the privi-
lege, the result should arguably be the same. The absence of the declarant is not
attributable to any wrongdoing by the defendant. But by hypothesis it is attributable
to the defendant's conduct intended toward that end - that is, the court finds that
but for the defendant's intercession the declarant would in fact not have claimed the
privilege, and this was the anticipated, presumably desired, result of the defendant's
conduct. How, then, can the defendant complain about his inability to confront and
examine the declarant? He might argue that he merely persuaded another person to
exercise her rights. I think this is a close issue. Perhaps the defendant ought t_ avoid
forfeiture in this setting only if he has a sufficiently close relationship with the
declarant that he has a substantial reason, apart from impairing the prosecution's
case against him, to persuade the declarant not to testify.
31 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (concealment or persuasion of
declarant, and misleading of authorities as to her whereabouts). See generally Steele
v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053
(1983) (declarant under control of defendant; summarizing case law from England
and United States: 'Wrongful conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats,
but it has also been held to include persuasion and control by a defendant, the
wrongful nondisclosure of information, and a defendant's direction to a witness to
exercise the fifth amendment privilege".).
32 See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627-31 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982).
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made, however, that the lower "more likely than not" standard should
apply.33
Given whatever standard of proof is applicable, the court must
resolve two types of uncertainties. First, should it attribute to the
defendant whatever conduct is said to have rendered the declarant
unavailable? Sometimes this question will be a frustrating one, be-
cause, while the unavailability of the declarant to testify might clearly
be in the interests of the defendant, it may be impossible to trace the
conduct to the defendant. The drafters of the prospective Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(6) have, I believe, made a sound judgment in allowing forfeiture
so long as the defendant "acquiesced" in the conduct rendering the
declarant unavailable; if, say, the defendant is in prison, knows about
the illicit efforts about to be made on his behalf, and does nothing to stop
them, forfeiture seems appropriate. But proving that the defendant
knew about the conduct may be as difficult in some cases as proving that
he ordered or engaged in it. Indeed, it was this concern that led to a
dubious loosening of the English statutory expression of the forfeiture
principle.
3 4
Second, has the declarant genuinely been rendered unavailable for
confrontation? In some cases, such as when the declarant has been
murdered shortly after making the declaration and died almost in-
stantly, unavailability will be clear. In other cases, the question may
be in doubt. In particular, notwithstanding the wrongdoing by the
accused, it may be that the prosecution could have done - or when the
declarant is living might still do - something to preserve a possibility
33 See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1204 (1984); State v. Gettings, 244 Kan. 236, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (1989). If the
court errs in either direction on the predicate question of whether the defendant
wrongfully rendered the declarant unavailable, the negative consequences are sub-
stantial. Note Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held
that the prosecution is not required by the Constitution to prove the voluntariness
of a confession by a standard greater than preponderance of the evidence - that is,
more likely than not. The Lego Court emphasized that "the purpose that a volun-
tariness hearing is designed to serve has nothing whatever to do with improving the
reliability ofjury verdicts" (at 486). The same might be held of the inquiry into the
assertion that the defendant's misconduct rendered the declarant unavailable.
34 See supra n. 3. Cf., e.g., United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) (witness
testifies before grand jury testimony and is later murdered in a manner suggestive
of contract killers admitted; the prosecution offers no evidence linking the defendants
to the murder; grand jury testimony admitted at trial, but on dubious grounds
without relying on forfeiture principle).
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of confrontation, or at least some aspect of it.15 When that is so, we
cannot say without qualification that the accused's conduct has ren-
dered confrontation impossible. I will postpone consideration of this
complexity until the next Part. There I will discuss it in the context of
three different situations in which the declarant is the victim of the
crime alleged and that crime is at least part of the conduct that has
assertedly rendered her unavailable to testify.
II. Forfeiture When the Declarant is the Victim
A. Identity of the Victim and Declarant
Now suppose that the declarant who has assertedly been rendered
unavailable is not just any potential witness but the victim of the crime
being charged. That in itself should not have any bearing on application
of the forfeiture principle.
Suppose, for example, that the accused is charged with armed rob-
bery, that sometime after the alleged crime the alleged 6 victim made
a statement asserting that the accused committed the crime, and that
at some point after the statement and before trial the accused murdered
the victim, death resulting immediately. Evidence of the victim-declar-
ant's accusatory statement may be particularly damning, but the rea-
sons for concluding that the accused has forfeited his confrontation right
by rendering her unavailable apply with the same force as if she were
merely an observer unaffected by the crime: By his intervention, the
accused has prevented the victim from being a witness for the prosecu-
tion, and so he should not be able to exclude secondary evidence of her
statement on the ground that he had no chance to confront her.
B. Should the Forfeiture Principle be Applied Reflexively?
Now ratchet the problem up another notch: Suppose that the conduct
that rendered the declarant-victim unavailable, rather than occurring
at some time after the crime charged, was the crime charged. This
35 Cf State v. Corrigan, 10 Kan. App.2d 55,691 P.2d 1311,1316 (1984) ('the State made
the required reasonable effort to produce the missing witness to justify a finding that
she was 'unavailable'").
36 For convenience's sake, I will now usually drop this word.
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situation raises the problem that is the particular focus of my interest
in this article, that of the reflexive forfeiture principle.
To take a straightforward example, suppose that the accused is on
trial for murder, and that during the short interval between the mur-
derous blow and the death of the victim, she made a statement accusing
the defendant of the crime. In such a case, for the court to conclude that
the accused committed the act rendering the declarant-victim unavail-
able, the court must also conclude that the defendant committed the
criminal act charged, because those two acts are the same. In other
words, a predicate proposition underlying the question of evidentiary
admissibility - here, that the accused murdered the victim - is iden-
tical to the proposition that one or more of the elements of the crime
being charged (here, perhaps all of them) are true.
I do not believe, however, that this identity presents a reason not to
apply the forfeiture principle. The identity should not distract us from
the importance of deciding the evidentiary predicate. If the predicate
is true, then (assuming for the moment that no failure on the part of the
prosecution contributed to the problem) the defendant's inability to
confront the declarant is attributable to his own misconduct. And if that
is true, the defendant should not be able to keep the declarant's state-
ment out of evidence by a claim of the confrontation right. A court
should not decline to decide the predicate question, for evidentiary
purposes, simply because the same question must also be decided in
making the bottom-line determination of guilt.
Moreover, although the matter is delicate, the identity of issues does
not pose insuperable administrative problems for application of the
forfeiture principle. Such an identity between predicate evidentiary
proposition and substantive element is not unheard of, but rather quite
familiar. When the prosecution offers an out-of-court statement as the
statement of a co-conspirator of the accused, then often a similar iden-
tity occurs - if the accused is being charged with conspiring with the
declarant, or the manner in which the crime was allegedly committed
involved such a conspiracy. To secure admission of the statement in
such a case, the prosecution must prove that the accused conspired with
the declarant, which it also must prove to secure conviction.
But the conundrum, in both the co-conspirator setting and in the case
of the crime that renders the victim unavailable to teEtify at trial, is
more apparent than real. If the case is being tried to a jury, the
predicate evidentiary question and the substantive question are deter-
mined by different factfinders, and the jury (unless knowledgeable in
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the law of evidence) will not be aware that the judge made a finding on
the evidentiary predicate. And, whether the case is being tried to a jury
or not, the two questions are tried on different factual bases3 7 and under
different standards of proof.38 It is not a charade, therefore, to say that,
although the two questions may be identical, they are tried separately
for separate purposes. It is perfectly plausible that the judge would
answer the predicate evidentiary question in favor of the prosecution,
but that the jury, applying a more stringent standard of proof to a more
limited set of information, would refuse to conclude that the same
proposition is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
There remains the "bootstrapping" problem - that is, the question
of whether, in determining the truth of the evidentiary predicate, the
court may consider the very statement that is at issue. Thus, if the judge
is trying to determine whether Victim's statement, "Accused has stabbed
me!" should be admitted on the grounds that Accused did indeed stab
Victim, resulting in her death and her unavailability at trial, may the
court use Victim's statement itself in making that determination? In
Bourjaily v. United States, reversing prior federal law, the United
States Supreme Court has held in the co-conspirator context that such
bootstrapping is permissible. 39 Many jurisdictions, however, continue
to adhere to the older rule against bootstrapping. For reasons suggested
in the paragraph just above, I believe that Bourjaily is correct, and that
bootstrapping is not troublesome: The evidentiary predicate is tried
separately from the substantive question, and so there is no incoherence
in allowing the judge, in determining the predicate evidentiary ques-
tion, to consider the very statement the admissibility of which is in
question. Indeed, so long as we generally allow the judge, in determin-
ing the evidentiary predicate, to consider non-privileged evidence that
would not be admissible before the jury,40 I do not believe that there is
37 Under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), the judge, in making the predicate evidentiary determi-
nation, 'is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges".
Thus, the predicate question may be decided on a wider factual base than the
substantive question. On the other hand, if the jurisdiction adheres to the traditional
rule against bootstrapping, discussed below, the statement at issue will not itself be
considered for the truth of what it asserts with respect to the predicate question,
though of course it will be considered on the substantive question if the court holds
it admissible.
38 See supra nn. 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing standard of proof for predi-
cate question).
39 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
40 See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
any good ground for excluding from the judge's consideration the state-
ment at issue, which might be very good evidence of the predicate fact.
But this entire issue is collateral to my main argument, and so I will
put it aside. The bootstrapping question, though important, goes merely
to the method by which the predicate proposition may be proved. The
theoretical underpinnings of the forfeiture principle, like those of the
doctrine of coconspirator statements, are the same whether bootstrapping
is allowed or not.
One other logical problem lurks, but I do not regard it as particularly
troublesome. Assuming that, but for the accused's conduct in commit-
ting the crime alleged, the victim would be available to testify, it may
also appear that, but for the same conduct, she would have nothing to
testify about. Thus, if the defendant had not murdered the victim, she
would have been able to testify, but if he had left her unharmed, she
would have no testimony to offer. How, then, can we say that, but for
the defendant's conduct, the victim would have testified? The solution,
it seems, is to compare the actual case not to the situation that would
exist if the defendant had done nothing, but to that in which the
defendant committed the same criminal conduct but not to the point of
substantially impairing the victim. We might bear in mind the irrev-
erent insight of one lawyer that a murder case is basically an assault
case with one fewer witness.
C. Specific Applications of the Reflexive Forfeiture Principle
I will now focus on three recurrent types of cases in which the
forfeiture principle might be applied to statements by the victim of a
crime who has been rendered unavailable by the criminal conduct itself.
1. Murder Victims
One type of case on which I have already touched is perhaps the
simplest: The defendant is on trial for murder, but before the victim
died she made a statement accusing the defendant of the crime, and the
court concludes as a predicate matter that he did indeed commit the
crime. Had the victim survived and been able to testify at trial without
impairment, her prior statement would have been excluded by the
confrontation right, under the view of that right presented here. But
in fact the defendant's own conduct has rendered the victim unavailable
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to testify.
In such a case, the most difficult problem in applying the forfeiture
principle will usually be determination of the predicate proposition, that
the defendant actually did murder the victim. Unavailability usually
will not be in doubt: Dead people don't testify.
Questions concerning unavailability are not altogether foreclosed,
however. Although, by hypothesis, the defendant's conduct rendered it
impossible for the victim to testify at trial, that does not necessarily
mean that preservation of any right to confront was impossible. The
prosecution should bear the burden of taking all reasonable steps to
protect whatever aspects of confrontation are possible given the defend-
ant's conduct, and of demonstrating that it has done so.
Suppose, then, that, after making her statement or indicating that
she would do so, the victim does not die immediately of her wounds but
rather lingers for some time in a fully cognizant state. Depending on
the precise nature of the victim's condition during this interim, it might
be reasonable to hold that, if the prosecution wishes to preserve the
victim's statement for use at trial, it ought to give the accused an
opportunity to take her deposition. That is, the prosecution ought to
notify the accused that the victim has made, or will make, a statement;
it should take the statement, or a repeat of the prior statement, under
oath; it should give the accused an opportunity to cross-examine; and
if possible it should videotape the proceedings. 41 Of course, the victim's
condition might make the arrangement of cross-examination or even the
formality of oath-taking too burdensome or impossible. Difficult factual
questions will surely arise.
But the notion of subjecting a dying victim to a deposition, complete
with cross-examination, is not farfetched. Indeed, this seems to have
been fairly standard practice nearly two centuries ago, and the courts
guarded with remarkable care the defendant's right to confront and
cross-examine the victim.
42
41 If the prosecution understands that the victim is prepared to make a statement, then
the prosecution ought not delay the taking of the statement until a time when a
deposition would be impossible; such delay should be charged against the prosecu-
tion, and probably should result in refusal to apply the forfeiture principle.
42 Under the statutes 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 13, § 4 (1554), and 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 10 (1555),
justices of the peace were directed to take the examinations of a felony suspect and
of the accusing witnesses. By custom, the examinations of the witnesses were taken
in the presence of the prisoner and under oath, and if the witness was later unavail-
able to testify at trial this earlier examination could be admitted. These examina-
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Under the approach I suggest, the fact that a statement fits within
an exception to the rule against hearsay would not take the statement
over the confrontation barrier.43  Thus, the traditional exception for
dying declarations would not defeat a confrontation claim. But notice
how sensible application of the forfeiture principle takes up the slack
left by the absence of the dying declaration exception - reaching the
same result in most cases, but not in all, and operating on a far more
justifiable basis.
The classic rationale for the dying declaration exception is that "no
person, who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker, will
do so with a lie upon his lips".44 However valid this logic may have been
in an earlier age, it hardly seems universally applicable now. For one
thing, many people do not believe in a hereafter; for them, indeed, the
impending end of life may offer relief from the consequences of speaking
falsely. Furthermore, even if the classic rationale were accurate, it
tions were sometimes used in the case of murder victims who lingered after the fatal
blow. See, e.g., R. v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 516 (1787) (noting that the whole of
the deposition was taken in the presence of the prisoner, and signed by the victim).
In R. v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B. 1789), in which the available
time was only a matter of hours, the defendant was not present at the examination,
but the examination was taken under oath and in writing; she affixed her mark to
a written rendition of the statement. It appears that the authorities, aware that the
victim might not be able to testify at trial, were careful to preserve at least part of
the protections that the accused would have if she did testify.
By the early nineteenth century, a greater adversarial spirit in litigation yielded even
greater judicial care. In R. v. Forbes, Holt 599, 171 E.R. 354 (1814), the defendant
was not present at the commencement of the deposition of his victim, though the
whole of the deposition was read over to him, apparently still in the presence of the
victim. The judge refused to admit the portion of the deposition taken before the
prisoner was present; he said that presence of the defendant "whilst the witness
actually delivers his testimony" was crucial "so that he may know the precise words
he uses, and observe throughout the manner and demeanour with which he gives his
testimony". R. v. Smith, Holt 614, 171 E.R. 357 (1817), involved similar facts, though
there the murder victim was resworn in the defendant's presence, and "re-asserted
what he had before said, by assenting to the deposition when slowly read over to him".
On these facts, a consultation of the judges apparently concluded that the entire
deposition was admissible. But the trial judge, Richards, C.B., took care to note that
"the decisions establish the point, that the prisoner ought to be present, that he might
cross-examine".
43 See above p. 514.
44 Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881) (Lush, L.J.).
Remarkably, this rationale was endorsed recently by the Supreme Court in Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).
[Is.L.R. Vol. 31
Nos. 1-3, 1997] CONFRONTATION AND THE DEFINITION OF CHUTZPA 527
would bear only on the testimonial capacity of sincerity; it would not,
in particular, offer any guarantee at all that, while the victim was being
murdered, her capacity of perception was operating in an especially high
gear. And, even assuming that the classic rationale does offer some
guarantee as to a dying declarant's truthtelling, the shape of the excep-
tion for dying declarations is curious: It should then apply to all
statements made under the sense of impending death, and not merely
to statements concerning the cause of the declarant's death.
The forfeiture principle, by contrast, does not operate on the principle
that the dying declaration is particularly trustworthy. Rather, the
premise is merely that the accused rendered the victim-declarant un-
able to testify at trial. The principle does not apply to dying declarations
in general; rather, when death is the reason for unavailability, the
prosecution must persuade the court that the accused is responsible for
the declarant's death. Accordingly, the rationale and scope of the
forfeiture principle, unlike those of the dying declaration exception, are
congruent with each other.
In another respect, the forfeiture principle is broader than the ration-
ale underlying the dying declaration exception: The statement need not
have been made under a sense of impending death for the principle to
apply. But if death did not follow quickly upon the statement, there may
be, depending upon the precise circumstances, an issue as to whether
the prosecution might have preserved at least some aspects of the
confrontation right. Thus, whether death is impending has significance
under the forfeiture principle, but not for the dubious about-to-meet-
her-Maker reason of the dying declaration exception.
2. Severely Battered Victims
Sometimes a criminal batters his victim so badly as to leave the
victim severely impaired, but not so badly as to kill her or deprive her
completely of testimonial ability. Thus, the victim might make a sig-
nificant statement, perhaps identifying the accused as the perpetrator,
but be unable to testify without impairment and subject to cross-exami-
nation at trial.
For example, in United States v. Napier,45 about eight weeks after the
beating, the victim, a Mrs. Caruso, was shown a newspaper photograph
45 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
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of the accused and reacted with great distress, saying "He killed me, he
killed me". She was not, however, called to testify at trial. Nevertheless,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the statement was admissible because viewing the picture was a stress-
ful event that brought the victim's responsive statement within the
exception for excited utterances. This application does not grievously
distort that exception, which is a rather odd one. But the suggestion
that because of the stressful circumstances the battered victim's state-
ment was highly reliable, and that because the statement fits within the
exception there is no confrontation concern, should be highly disturb-
ing.
46
United States v. Owens47 provides another interesting example. There,
Foster, a prison guard, was savagely beaten. About three weeks after
the beating, Foster made a statement identifying Owens as the assail-
ant. Foster was able to testify at trial, but he was impaired to the point
that, although he could remember making the prior statement, he did
not remember other statements he had made identifying the assailant,
or whether Owens really was the assailant, or why he had identified
Owens. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that in
these circumstances Owens' opportunity to cross-examine Foster did not
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Brennan and Marshall stood alone,
however. Simply because Foster did not remember, Justice Scalia wrote
for the Court, did not mean that Owens' opportunity to cross-examine
him was unsatisfactory. Indeed, Justice Scalia contended, one of the
goals of Owens' cross-examination might be to demonstrate the weak-
ness of Foster's memory. 48 But this argument is most unsatisfactory,
given that there was no doubt that Foster's memory loss was genuine,
and that the state of his memory at the time of trial had no clear bearing
on the state of his memory at the time he made the statement. There
was a good deal of truth to Justice Brennan's statement that "the John
Foster who ... identified [Owens] as his attacker ... did not testify at
[Owens'] trial".
49
46 Napier did not actually discuss the Confrontation Clause, but under White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346 (1992), the holding that the statement satisfied the excited utterance
exception would also be sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
47 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
48 Ibid., at 559-60.
49 Ibid., at 566.
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Now let us see how Napier and Owens would be addressed under the
approach presented in this article. First of all, clearly Foster's state-
ments, and probably Mrs. Caruso's as well, should be considered accu-
satory and so covered by the confrontation right.50 Second, a violation
of that right would not be countenanced because the statement fit
within an exemption to the rule against hearsay, either the traditional
one for excited utterances, the one created by Rule 801(d)(1)(C) for prior
statements of identification and held applicable in Owens,51 or any
other. Third, a court should frankly acknowledge that the condition of
the declarant would be inadequate to satisfy the confrontation right
under ordinary circumstances. But finally, if- a very big if- the court
concludes to the requisite degree of certainty that the impairment of the
declarant's testimonial capacities was indeed attributable to battering
by the accused, the forfeiture principle would apply.
The question remains, though, what the prosecution should be re-
quired to do in such a case to preserve whatever aspects of confrontation
are possible. In Napier, it seems the prosecution should be required at
least to give the defense notice that Mrs. Caruso has made a statement
identifying him, and to give him an opportunity to take her testimony
under oath at a deposition. Arguably, the prosecution should also be
required to present her as a witness at trial, to allow the defendant to
have whatever cross-examination is possible given her condition. I do
not believe this should always be required, however. It seems to me
sufficient if the prosecution does whatever it has to do to ensure that the
defendant can, if he wishes, procure her testimony. If the defendant
decides to do without her live appearance, then the hearsay statement
ought to be admitted. But, if the defendant does timely present her in
50 There is some ambiguity in Mrs. Caruso's case, because she might well have lacked
the capacity to appreciate the law enforcement consequences of her statement. But
the statement did accuse Napier of committing a crime, and it clearly was hostile.
See supra n. 20 and accompanying text.
51 A predicate for applicability of this rule is that the declarant must "testifly] at the
trial ... and [be] subject to cross-examination concerning the statement". Under
analysis similar in some respects to that used in the Confrontation Clause context,
the Court held that Foster was subject to cross-examination notwithstanding his
assertion of memory loss.
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court, then the prosecution ought to be required to put her on the stand
as part of its case or forgo use of the prior testimony.52
In Owens, the prosecution went further than in Napier: It actually
did call Foster to the stand, thus giving Owens the chance to cross-
examine him for whatever it was worth. But could the prosecution have
done more? I see one possibility, though it is unclear from the Supreme
Court opinions whether the prosecution should be held accountable to
failure to follow it. Foster's statement was apparently made during a
period of relative lucidity. Perhaps the prosecution should be held
52 This procedure would implement a proposal I offered, for the context in which
confrontation rights are not at stake, in "Improving the Procedure for Resolving
Hearsay Issues", (1991) 13 Cardozo L. R. 883, at 892-97. I suggested there that
ordinarily, if the court is inclined to admit a hearsay declaration but the opponent
of the evidence timely produces the declarant, the proponent of the evidence ought
to be required either to present the live testimony of the declarant as part of his case
or forgo use of the declaration. One impetus behind this suggestion is that, for
various reasons, the opponent's ability to subject the declarant to an effective adverse
examination is far better if the declarant is already on the stand as part of the
proponent's case than if the opponent must later call her to the stand as part of his
own case. Given that this procedure offers the opponent a good opportunity to
examine the declarant - assuming the opponent could produce her and he finds it
worthwhile to do so - it makes admission of the hearsay a more palatable alterna-
tive. It also avoids waste. Under current practice, the opponent often objects to the
hearsay evidence not because he really wishes to examine the declarant but in hopes
that the proponent will be forced to forgo her evidence altogether; often, though, the
proponent's response is to undertake the cost of producing the declarant as a live
witness. Under this proposal, by contrast, the declarant is produced only if the
opponent genuinely believes that the opportunity to examine her is worth the cost
of doing so.
I do not believe that this procedure should generally be implemented when confron-
tation rights are at issue. In general, I believe the prosecution, rather than the
defense, ought to go to the trouble and expense of producing a declarant whose
statement it wishes to use; moreover, if there is a chance that the declarant could
not be produced, the prosecution, rather than the defense, ought to bear that risk.
In the Napier situation, however, several factors cut the other way. First, the judicial
system ought to be reluctant to press the declarant to testify. Second, it seems highly
likely that the defendant's objection is indeed a bluff: He does not want a chance to
cross-examine the declarant, but is rather hoping that the prosecution loses the
evidence. Third, it appears clear that the declarant could be brought to the witness
stand, if that is really desired. In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to say
to the defendant, in effect, "The secondary evidence of the declaration will be
admitted, unless you produce the declarant", rather than to say to the prosecution,
"The secondary evidence will be excluded, unless you produce the declarant".
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accountable for failure to anticipate that this period would be fleeting.
Perhaps, therefore, as in the case of a victim whose death it anticipated,
the prosecution should have given the accused prompt notice of the
statement and an opportunity to cross-examine while that opportunity
would have potential value.
Once again, then, I do not contend that my approach would avoid the
need to decide difficult factual questions. But these questions would at
least be the right ones to decide. And they would avoid the type of
hypocrisy that led the Owens Court to conclude that Owens' opportunity
to cross-examine Foster was satisfactory. The opportunity was not
satisfactory; if the decision to admit Foster's statement was neverthe-
less proper, that is because Owens himself was responsible for the
problem.
3. Child Victims of Physical or Sexual Abuse
The problem has become all too familiar: How should a judicial
system present the observations of a child who, allegedly at least, has
been the victim of physical or sexual abuse? In a frequently recurring
pattern, the child makes a statement to a trusted adult, such as a
parent, but her live testimony is not presented at trial. Perhaps she is
too young to be able to answer questions directly addressed to the
incident, especially when surrounded by the trappings of trial. Perhaps
her parents or other caretakers, or even the prosecution, are afraid of
traumatizing her. And perhaps she has been intimidated into silence.
Whatever the reason for her failure to testify, the prosecution offers
secondary evidence of her out-of-court statement, and the accused ob-
jects on confrontation grounds.
Some courts, eager to secure the admittance of such evidence, have
brought into play traditional hearsay exceptions, such as those for
excited utterances, statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment, and statements of bodily or mental condition. 53 Some of
these decisions apply the exceptions within their customary bounds, but
others do not. Other jurisdictions have developed a "tender years"
exception specifically addressed to this type of case.
54
53 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (excited utterances and statements
for medical treatment).
54 E.g., Rev. C. Wash. Ann. § 9A.44.120.
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For reasons already discussed, I do not believe that this genus of
approaches - using or developing exceptions to the rule against hear-
say - is an appropriate solution to this very serious problem. Assum-
ing, as is usually the case, that the child's statement is one to which the
confrontation right ought to apply,55 the right should not be defeated by
invocation of any hearsay exception, whether new or old, whether a
sound application of doctrine or a distortion of it.
Nor, for several reasons, do I believe that secondary evidence of the
child's statement should be admitted because of fear that requiring her
to testify would cause her great trauma. First, child witnesses are not
alone in finding testimony traumatic. The adult rape complainant may
find the experience equally as traumatic, or perhaps even more so, but
we do not conclude for that reason that the accused may be convicted
on the strength of her statement without affording him the opportunity
to confront her.
Second, while the experience of testifying in front of the accused may
undoubtedly cause significant trauma to the child, the available evi-
dence suggests that testifying does not usually have severe, long-term
effects .56
Third, if the experience of testifying in court, surrounded by the full
formal trappings of the procedure, genuinely is likely to cause the child
severe trauma, there are better alternatives, more consonant with the
accused's rights than simply doing without her live testimony and
relying instead on secondary evidence of her prior statement. Her
55 There is a possibility that, in some cases, the confrontation right ought not to apply
because the child lacked so much maturity and understanding at the time of her
statement that the statement ought not be considered accusatory. (The child's lack
of maturity and understanding might also diminish the probative value to be at-
tached to the statement, but not necessarily below the point sufficient to warrant
admissibility.) If a dog's bark has sufficient probative value, we do not exclude it
because the accused has not had a chance to cross-examine the dog. It may be that
the cry for help of a young child, even if verbalized, bears a closer material resem-
blance to the dog's bark than to an adult's accusatory declaration.
56 See Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child
Sexual Assault Victims (1992) 114-15 (summarizing conclusions from a large study:
"On average, the short-term effects [of testifying] on the children's behavioral adjust-
ment, as reported by their caretakers, were more harmful than helpful. In contrast,
by the time the cases were resolved, the behavioral adjustment of most, but not all,
children who testified was similar to that of children who did not take the stand. The
general course for these children, as for the control children, was gradual improve-
ment".).
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testimony, might, for example, be videotaped outside the courtroom, if
necessary outside the physical presence of the accused. I have doubts
whether such a procedure should be deemed adequate, 57 but it is cer-
tainly better than nothing.
Fourth, if the child's caretakers are genuinely concerned that, no
matter what precautions are taken, testifying will cause the child severe
trauma, they simply need not require her to do so. Of course, if absent
her live testimony secondary evidence of the prior statement is inadmis-
sible, the probability of securing a conviction against the accused may
diminish to the vanishing point. And, when the accused is in fact guilty,
that is a very unfortunate result. But it is nothing new. Often pros-
ecutions are lost, or never brought, because the complaining witness is
unwilling to testify. Again, the case of adult rape provides a prime
example.
Finally - a point that will not have universal appeal - I find
disturbing an approach that says to the accused, in effect, "Well, per-
haps you have a fundamental right at stake here, but someone else
would be hurt if we allowed you to invoke it against the state and yet
insisted on prosecuting you". Perhaps it is too late in this "age of
balancing" to argue against such willingness to balance away the rights
of an accused against the state. 58 But I prefer viewing the accused's
fundamental rights, at least at their core, as truly fundamental and not
subject to being balanced away.
In some circumstances, however, the forfeiture principle may validly
come into play. Suppose that the prosecutor, with the cooperation of the
child's caretakers, makes a genuine effort by appropriate means to get
the child to testify, but that the child fails to do so. Sometimes this
failure may be attributable to the child's age and immaturity, and thus
be independent of the abuse being tried. But in other cases, the child
has been intimidated, either by the abusive conduct itself or by a
threatening statement - "Don't tell anyone!" - that accompanied or
57 But see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (considering a procedure allowing
a child to testify in a child abuse case out of the presence of the accused by one-way
closed circuit television, and holding the procedure permissible if the trial court
determines that the procedure "is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular
child witness who seeks to testify", ibid., at 855).
58 But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing", (1987)
96 Yale L.J. 943.
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followed the conduct. In such a case, application of the forfeiture
principle may be appropriate. 9
Applying the principle in this context is, I acknowledge, particularly
difficult. There is, of course, the basic predicate question that underlies
any application of the forfeiture principle: Did the accused actually
commit the conduct that assertedly rendered the witness unavailable?
But the complexities only begin there. Is the child's silence really a
product of intimidation, rather than age and immaturity?60 And even
if the child should be deemed unavailable to testify in court under
ordinary procedures, there is the question of what steps, if any, the
prosecution must take, as a prerequisite to introducing secondary evi-
dence of the prior statement, to preserve as much as possible of the
confrontation right. For example, perhaps the prosecution ought to
have made the child available for examination, either at a pretrial
deposition or during trial, under as comforting circumstances as possi-
ble, presumably without the defendant present.
59 See State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411,435-42,484A.2d 1330,1345-48 (Burlington
Co. 1984) (confrontation right held inapplicable because defendant threatened to kill
child victim of sexual abuse if she revealed his activities); but see State v. Jarzbek,
204 Conn. 683, 699, 529 A.2d 1245, 1253 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988)
("Here, ... although the threats made by the defendant against the minor victim were
... designed to conceal his wrongdoing, they were made during the commission of
the very crimes with which he is charged ... The constitutional right of confrontation
would have little force ... if we were to find an implied waiver of that right in every
instance where the accused, in order to silence his victim, uttered threats during the
commission of the crime for which he is on trial".).
60 The child's silence may also be attributable to her caretaker's desire to protect her
from trauma. The caretaker may refuse to make the child available to testify, or
instruct her not to testify. In such a case, the child should probably not be deemed
unavailable by virtue of the defendant's wrongdoing unless the prosecution uses
against the caretaker the coercive measures that it would use if the caretaker were
the declarant. If such measures fail to yield the testimony, and if the court is
persuaded that the caretaker's refusal to allow the testimony is attributable to the
defendant's wrongdoing, then probably the case should be treated as if the caretaker
were the declarant and was intimidated by the defendant. Arguably, to reach this
point the prosecution should have to show only that coercive measures would have
been futile. Such a rule would require great care in operation, however, for under
it admission of the prior statement could be secured if the caretaker merely stood up
to what might be an idle threat by a friendly prosecutor; the door would be wide open
to collusion and strategic game-playing.
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Notwithstanding the great difficulty in resolving issues such as
these, I believe this is a burden that should be shouldered. On the one
hand, our eagerness to secure just convictions for the tragic crime of
child abuse ought not lead us to abrogate fundamental rights of the
accused. And on the other hand, to the extent that the accused's own
conduct has prevented the child from testifying against him, invocation
of his confrontation right should not prevent the best possible evidence
of her story from being considered by the factfinder.
III. Conclusion
My conclusions do not all point in one direction. Rather, they
rebound from one direction to another: A conclusion that is receptive
to evidence in one respect makes it easier to accept another conclusion
that, in some other respect, burdens or precludes the admissibility of
evidence.
I have suggested that, to invoke the forfeiture principle, the prosecu-
tion should be required to show that it has done what it could reasonably
do to preserve to the maximum extent possible the defendant's confron-
tation right.
Imposing this restriction on the prosecution makes it more appropri-
ate to impose the forfeiture principle, including its reflexive aspect, on
the accused. Thus, if the accused's conduct has rendered the victim-
declarant unavailable to testify, secondary evidence of her statement
may be admitted over his objection based on the confrontation right.
In turn, recognition of the forfeiture principle makes it more palat-
able to recognize a strong confrontation right that, while limited in
scope, generally excludes secondary evidence of an accusatory state-
ment - irrespective of whether the statement fits within a hearsay
exception, new or old, of whether the court deems the statement reliable,
of whether the declarant is unavailable, or of whether exclusion of the
statement entails substantial costs.
And recognition of such a strong confrontation right in turn makes
it easier to accept a generous law of hearsay that usually, when confron-
tation rights are not at stake, results in admission of the evidence for
what it is worth.
In short, significant as the forfeiture principle is in its own right -
because the cases to which it applies are so important - one of its most
crucial roles may be to help provide the underpinnings for a sound
theory of confrontation and hearsay.
